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Abstract 
 
This paper quantifies the effect of non-traditional monetary easing at the zero lower bound 
on interest rate, so called “quantitative easing monetary policy” which the BOJ adopted 
from March 2001 through June 2006, by changing operating target for money market from 
the uncollateralized call rate to the outstanding current account balances held by financial 
institutes at the BOJ. The paper confirms that the monetary policy has contributed to the 
recovery of the prolonged deflation. First we estimate a minimal VAR model, which 
consists of the current account balances at the BOJ (CABs) as a policy variable, real GDP, 
and inflation rate. Next we decompose money stock into transaction money and 
precautionary money to evaluate the transmission mechanism of the effect of CABs on the 
real economy by taking into account the financial anxiety. We have found a quantitative -
easing shock firstly increase transaction money and then raise output and price, which 
dispel the anxiety. We also confirm that a liquidity trap did not exist during the period of 
quantitative easing monetary policy. 
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Introduction  
The aim of the paper is to statistically quantify the effect of the Quantitative Easy Monetary Policy 
from March 2001 through June 2006 on the Japan’s prolonged recession. The BOJ has started the 
QEMP again after the Lehman Brothers’ shock in 2008. New Prime Minister Shinzou Abe enforced 
the BOJ to take monetary easing in much larger scale to combat against the Japan’s prolonged 
deflation, when he took office in the end of 2012. He has always condemned BOJ’s policy stance as 
too conservative2. The BOJ’s governor has been changed from Masaaki Shirakawa to Haruhiko 
Kuroda in March 20133.  New governor Kuroda has started a QEMP in larger scale. Some indicate the 
risk to expand the size of the BOJ’s balance sheet without any favourable effect on the economy. 
Many empirical researches have been done on the first QEMP as to whether there was an effect or not. 
Most of the researches show the negative results on the effect of QEMP4. However several researches 
confirm the effectiveness by the sample period contains the whole period of QEMP. 
We estimate the effect of the QEMP focusing on the role of expectation. QEMP is supposed to foster 
the expectation that there would not be the financial uncertainty in the future. 
 
1 Overview 
Japan’s economy had experienced the prolonged recession after the bust of bubble in the early 1990s. 
The BOJ gradually reduced its policy target, uncollateralized overnight call rate to overcome the 
deteriorated economy.  The BOJ lowered the rate to 0.02% in February 1999 after the financial crisis 
in 1997 and 1998, when several Japan’s major financial institutes collapsed and the Japan premium 
surged in the overseas markets. The BOJ literally took the “zero-interest rate policy”.  However the 
economy rapidly deteriorated when BOJ lifted the zero-interest rate policy by raising the call rate to 
0.25% in 2000. In response to the difficult situation, the BOJ adopted the “quantitative easy monetary 
policy” by changing operating target for money market from the uncollateralized call rate to the 
outstanding current account balances held by financial institutes at the BOJ5. The Target change of the 
                                                            
2 FRB economists attributed the prolonged recession of Japanese economy to the BOJ’s policy. Japan’s deflation 
could have been averted if the BOJ took easing policy in the beginning of 1990s.See Ahearne, A., J. Gagnon, J. 
Haltmair, and S. Kamin (2002). 
3 A former governor Shirakawa always insisted the ineptness of monetary policy under the deflationary 
economy. For example, he told in the speech of 2012; Starting from fiscal 2000, if one assumes that an increase 
in money will feed into prices in accordance with the quantity theory of money, the average rate of inflation in 
terms of the year-on year rate of change in the CPI would become 4.8 per cent when one uses the monetary base 
and 1.6 per cent when one uses the money stock. These two figures are considerably different from -0.2 per cent 
which is what we actually see in the real world.  
4 Ugai (2006) surveys the empirical researches on the QEMP. Many researches denied the effect of QEMP, or 
showed the very limited effect, if any, according to his survey.  
5 The quantitative easing framework which the BOJ adopted in March 2001 consists of the following three 
characteristics. (1) The changing of the main operating target for money-market operations from the 
uncollateralized overnight call rate to the outstanding balance of the current accounts at the Bank (CABs).  (2) 
The commitment by the Bank to keep the new procedures for money-market operations in place until the CPI 
CAB during the QEMP period is shown in Table 1.  BOJ started its new policy with 5 trillion yen in 
March 2001 and increased the reserves to reach 10 to 15 trillion yen in December 2001. The BOJ set 
the reserve at the most, 35 trillion yen in January 2004. The required reserve is 4 trillion yen. The new 
policy ceased in March 2006, when the BOJ judged that further easing would trigger the inflation 
because CPI inflation rate has been slightly positive and the economy showed the signal of the 
recovery.  
However the role of money stock in the monetary policy has been graded down in the process of 
deflation. BOJ (2003) shows that there is not any close relationship among money stock and the real 
economy by performing the cointegration analysis among M2, real GDP and opportunity cost based 
on the data extending the period to 2002.    
 
Table 1 Target change of the CAB during the QEMP 
Date   Targets of the CAB 
March 19, 2001 From 4 trillion yen to around 5 trillion yen  
August 14, 2001 From 5 trillion yen to around 6 trillion yen 
September 18, 2001 From 5 trillion yen to above 5 trillion yen 
December 19, 2001 From above 6 trillion yen to 10-15 trillion yen 
October 30, 2002 From 10-15 trillion yen to 15-20 trillion yen 
March 25, 2003 From 15-20 trillion yen to 17-22 trillion yen 
April 30, 2003 From 17-22 trillion yen to 22-27 trillion yen 
May 20, 2003 From 22-27 trillion yen to 27-30 trillion yen 
October 10, 2003 From 27-30 trillion yen to 27-32 trillion yen 
January 20, 2004 From 27-32 trillion yen to 30-35 trillion yen 
March 9, 2006 Lift of QEMP 
 
2 Review of literature on the QEMP 
Monetary policy works through the interest rate channel in the normal situation. Monetary easing will 
increase monetary base which reduce the short-term interest rate. The lower interest rate affects the 
longer interest rates of financial assets, which will stimulate the investment and consumption, and 
finally contribute to the boost of economy.  However monetary policy does not work through this 
channel when the interest rate reaches at zero or close zero per cent. A liquidity trap appears because 
money and bond becomes a perfect substitute when interest rate is at its lower bound. 
Several empirical works has been done on the effectiveness of monetary policy under the zero bound 
constraint of the interest rate. Baig (2002) shows that monetary policy still work well even at the zero 
interest rate by using VAR model. He points that expansion of monetary base has a positive effect on 
the prices and output. However his sample period from 1980 to 2001 includes the period when 
Japan’s economy is very sound and interest rate is far from zero. His result is not satisfactory because 
it does not reflect the effect of the monetary base in the period of zero interest rate. Taking the 
problem into consideration, Kimura et al. (2002) estimated by using a time -varying VAR. A time -
varying VAR can capture the changes in the policy that varies over time. Their result is that the effect 
of the increase in the monetary base at the zero interest rate period is very limited, if any, suggesting 
the inept of monetary policy.  Fujiwara (2006) also showed the same result by using a Markov 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
registers either zero per cent year-on-year growth or an increase. (3) Increases in the Bank’s outright purchases 
of long-term government bonds, in case it considers the increase necessary for providing liquidity smoothly. 
switching VAR model. Their problem in common is that their sample period covers only the former 
period of the zero interest rate and quantitative easy monetary policy.  
Honda et al. (2007, 2010) and Harada and Masuda (2010) estimated the effectiveness of monetary 
easing by the sample period covers the whole implementation period of QEMP. Honda et al. (2007, 
2010) estimated the effect of the QEMP on the Japan’s economy by the Vector auto regressing model 
composing of industrial production, CPI, and the current account balances at the BOJ.  In addition, 
they used several financial data to identify the transmission mechanism of monetary policy. They 
concluded that the QEMP had a positive effect on the economy and the effectiveness worked through 
share price channel.  
Harada and Masuda (2010) also conducted the same VAR analysis in the period of the QEMP. They 
estimated based on the Honda et al (2007, 2010). They increased the number of variables to focus on 
the transmission mechanism. They basically confirmed the results of the Honda et al. They newly 
found the transmission mechanism through the bank’s balance sheet channel in addition to share price 
channel. 
Nakazawa and Yoshikawa (2011) estimated the effect of the QEMP by the VAR model composed of 
three variables; the current account balances, nominal GDP, and share price. They focus on the BOJ’s 
asset composition which expanded through the purchases of government bonds (JGB). They 
reconfirm the results of Honda et al. (2007, 2010) and Harada and Masuda (2010). However they 
indicate that the JGBs’ maturity which BOJ purchased in the QEMP is mainly from one to three years, 
suggesting that it would have a stronger effect if the BOJ purchased JGBs with the longer-term 
maturity. 
These new researches shows that BOJ’s non-traditional monetary easing from 2001 through 2006 had 
a positive effect on the Japan’s economy, suggesting the BOJ should continue the monetary easing to 
conquer Japan’s deflationary economy. However they do not analyse the role of the anxiety in the 
deflationary economy. Under the severe deflation, people tend to stick to cash because they had the 
cash-flow constraints. Krugman (1998, 2000) indicated that additional monetary easing would not 
have a positive effect on the economy, because monetary base and bonds became a perfect substitute 
at the almost zero interest rate. Japan’s economy had fallen into “a liquidity trap.” He argued that 
natural rate of interest rate became negative in the deflation, while nominal interest rate could not be 
reduced below zero. He insisted to take the policy to foster the inflation expectation to exempt from 
the deflation trap. Inflation expectation will raise the natural rate of interest rate in the future, which 
will stimulate the consumption and investment. 
Several researches have been done on the change of the future expectation in the period of the QEMP. 
Okina and Shiratuka (2004) and Shiratuka et al. (2010) focus on the effect of the BOJ’s commitment 
to maintain the QEMP until core CPI registers stably zero per cent or an increase year on year. The 
longer term interest rate would decline even if the short term interest rate already reached at the zero 
interest rate, as far as the private sector confirms the BOJ’s commitment. The decline of the longer-
term interest rate is expected to stimulate the investment and consumption6. They estimate the 
relationship between the future expectation and the economic variables (inflation rate, output and 
interest rates) by time-varying parameter vector autoregression model with stochastic volatility (TVP-
VAR).  They conclude that the BOJ’s commitment does not have a positive effect on the dynamic 
relationship of prices and production, though it has succeeded in changing the future expectation of 
the financial market, firms, and household, only in the first year when the QEMP was adopted. 
 
                                                            
6 Ueda (2002) called the effect of monetary easing on the yield curve “the policy duration effect.” 
We also investigate the role of expectation in the QEMP period from the different view point. We 
focus on the role of a kind of expectation, financial anxiety in the deflationary economy. We will clear 
why the BOJ should continue the quantity easing policy. People are afraid of the risk they cannot get 
money from the financial institute in the deflation. They tend to hold money as much as possible in 
order to avoid the cash-flow constrains. Such a financial behaviour of the people in the deflation 
rapidly increases the precautionary money demand. Money will not have a positive effect on the 
economy even if the central bank increases the money stock, because additional money will be 
absorbed as precautionary demand. The precautionary demand for money will decline if people 
confirm the BOJ’s commitment to continue the QEMP until the economy get rid of the deflation. 
The QEMP is supposed to have a positive effect on the economy, as far as the BOJ keep to provide 
more money than the money which the firms and households need to make an economic activity 
smoothly in the deflationary economy. Thus, we estimate the effect of quantitative easing policy on 
the economy by decomposing money stock into the transaction and the precautionary money. The 
former money will contribute to the improvement of the economy, while the latter will not. The 
monetary easing would lose its effectiveness if additional money is absorbed as precautionary money.  
3 VAR model 
3.1 The Data Property 
Variables and their symbolic notations are given below. 
The data we estimate here are the Current Account Balances at the BOJ (CAB), Money Stock 
(M2+CD), Business Cycle of Tankan Diffusion Index, the uncollateralized overnight call rate,  real 
GDP, and the core Consumer Price Index (CPI).  These data are symbolized, respectively, dpst, m2, 
tankan, call, y, and p. All data except for the core CPI are obtained from Website of Bank of Japan. 
The core CPI is obtained from Website of Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications. 
The new variable has to capture the psychological change of people due to the financial 
anxieties. We used the Diffusion Index issued quarterly by Bank of Japan known as 
TANKAN in order to qualify the unobservable variable. We display the behaviour of each 
variable in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1 the behaviour of each variable 
 
We apply two conventional unit-root tests, DF-GLS (ERS) and KPSS test to the logs of the time 
series for each variable. ERS tests the unit root of the time series as the null hypothesis, 
while KPSS test the stationarity as the null hypothesis. The results are shown in table 2. 
Tankan is shown to be stationary, while call, y and p are nonstationary.  We assume that 
dpst is nonstationary and that inflation (=p(t)/p(t-4)) is stationary, though these data cannot 
be strictly judged to be nonstationary or stationary by both tests. 
    Table 2 Unit root test (1981q3, 2007q4) 
var. ERS(t-stats) lag KPSS(LM-stats) trend 
dpst -1.75526* 1 0.60521** const. 
tankan -2.83677** 1 0.20946 const. 
call -0.02444 0 0.98470*** const. 
y=log(realGDP) 0.84268 3 1.04898*** const. 
p=coreCPI 0.45950 4 0.983331*** const. 
inflation=p(t)/p(t-4) -1.46771 1 0.060818 trend+const. 
***, ** and,* denote significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively 
 
3.2 Model1  
We first estimate the simple three-variable VAR that consists of the Current Account Balances at the 
BOJ (dpst), real GDP(y), and the core Consumer Price Index (p=core CPI) where p is changed into 
inflation=p(t)/p(t-4).  All variables are estimated, following the result of unit-root test. The sample 
period is from Q2 2001 through Q4 2005. 
Letting ൌ ሺ∆݀݌ݏݐ, ∆ݕ, ݂݈݅݊ܽݐ݅݋݊ሻ′ , we consider a growth rate system	described by VAR (Vector Auto 
Regression) model of the form:  
ݔሺݐሻ ൌ ܣ଴ ൅ ܣଵݔሺݐ െ 1ሻ ൅ ܣଶݔሺݐ െ 2ሻ ൅ ߝሺݐሻ 
 
The dynamic impulse response functions are shown in Figure 2. The first to third column show the 
dynamic responses of each variable to policy shock (CAB shock), an output shock, and price change 
shock, respectively.  The solid line shows the point estimate of impulse response function, while the 
dotted lines imply 95 % confidential interval. 
The interesting findings which the simple model gives are as follows. The first column shows that 
policy shock has a positive effect on real output. Output starts to increase with a lag of three quarters 
after CAB rises.  The positive response is statistically significant at 5 % level at third quarter. 
Quantity easing monetary policy surely contributes to the recovery of Japan’s recession. The second 
column displays that an output shock has an immediate effect on the price change.  The third column 
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also shows that price change has a positive shock on the real output.  Thus, we can summarize the 
effect of monetary policy easing during the QEMP starting at March 2001 as follows. 
Quantitative monetary easing policy has a positive effect on Japan’s deflationary economy. The 
policy effect starts at the increase of current account balances at the BOJ. The effect has a positive 
effect on the economy, though it takes time for its effect to exert. Easing policy does not have an 
effect on the deflation. However, it has indirectly the effect on the price change, through the effect on 
the real output.  Increase of real output tends to improve the deflation.  Improvement of deflation has 
a positive effect on the real output.     
 
Figure 2 Impulse Response Functions for 3 variables (∆ሺࢊ࢖࢙࢚ሻ, ∆ሺ࢟ሻ, ࢏࢔ࢌ࢒ࢇ࢚࢏࢕࢔ሻ 
3.3 Model 2 
Next we statistically quantify how much money contributed to the recovery of the economy when the 
BOJ increased the current account balances at the BOJ. We would decompose the money stock into 
the transaction money and the precautionary money.   
Precautionary demand will increase when the liquidity concern among the private sector intensify in 
the depression, while its demand will decrease when the concern dispels in the boom. We use here the 
Corporate Financial Position Diffusion Index issued quarterly by Bank of Japan known as TANKAN7 
in order to qualify the unobservable variable, which would affect the precautionary demand. 
We assume the precautionary money demand as follows. 
                                                            
7 The Tankan is a statistical survey data by the BOJ, conducted quarterly every year. The survey is done to 
provide an accurate of business trends of enterprises. Business Condition asked ; 1 Favourable, 2 Not so 
favourable, 3 Unfavourable. Responses are aggregated into Diffusion Index (DI) as follows; 
DI = percentage share of enterprises responding choice 1 minus percentage share of  enterprises responding 
choice 3    
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݌ݎ݁ܿ. ݀݁݉ܽ݊݀ ൌ ݐݎ݁݊݀ ൅ ܿଵ ∗ ݐܽ݊݇ܽ݊ ∗ ݉2100000 
൅ܿଶ ∗ ݀݌ݏݐ ∗ ݀ݑ݉݉ݕௗ௣௦௧ ൅ ܿଷ ∗ ݈݈ܿܽ ∗ ݀ݑ݉݉ݕ௖௔௟௟ ∗ 1000,                                (1) 
 
where the 2nd term on the RHS means that the precautionary money demand is a function of 
tankan*m2, because people try to hold more money when financial anxiety raises, it also 
depends on the level of m2, the 3rd term and 4th term represents the effect of the BOJ’ 
monetary policy. We take into the consideration the policy change by adding the dummy 
variables. The BOJ adopts the zero interest rate policy in February 1999 and temporarily 
lifts its policy in August 2000. It implements the QEMP from March 2001 through March 
2006. Thus, the dummy variables are set as follows. 
 
݀ݑ݉݉ݕ௖௔௟௟ ൌ 1					for		݈݈ܿܽ ് 0,				1980ݍ1 െ 1998ݍ4, 2000ݍ3 െ 2000ݍ4, 2006ݍ3 െ 2007ݍ4 ݀ݑ݉݉ݕ௖௔௟௟ ൌ 0					for		݈݈ܿܽ ൌ 0,				1999ݍ1 െ 2000ݍ2, 2001ݍ1 െ 2006ݍ2 
and 
݀ݑ݉݉ݕௗ௣௦௧ ൌ 1					for		݈݈ܿܽ ൌ 0,				1999ݍ1 െ 2000ݍ2, 2001ݍ1 െ 2007ݍ4 
݀ݑ݉݉ݕௗ௣௦௧ ൌ 0					for		݈݈ܿܽ ് 0,				1980ݍ1 െ 1998ݍ4, 2000ݍ3 െ 2000ݍ4 
and 
݀ݑ݉݉ݕௗ௣௦௧ ൌ 1					݀ݑ݉݉ݕ௖௔௟௟ ൌ 1, ݂ܽݐ݁ݎ	2006	ݍ3 
 
’’trend’’ in equation (1) is defined by using dummy variables in each year: 
 
ݐݎ݁݊݀ሺݐሻ ൌ 1000 ∗ ሼܿሺ81ሻ ൅ ܿሺ82ሻ ∗ ଼݀ଶሺݐሻ ൅ ܿሺ83ሻ ∗ ଼݀ଷሺݐሻ ൅ ⋯൅ ܿሺ107ሻ ∗ ݀ଵ଴଻ሺݐሻሽ, 
 
where c(81) is constant during the whole interval (1981q3, 2007q4), and where dummy 
variables d82, d83, d84,..., d107 are of the form:  
 
଼݀ଶሺݐሻ ൌ 1						for		ݐ ൌ 1982q1, q2, q3, q4 														ൌ 0																					otherwise, 
଼݀ଷሺݐሻ ൌ 1						for		ݐ ൌ 1983ݍ1, ݍ2, ݍ3, ݍ4 														ൌ 0																					otherwise, 
⋯⋯⋯ 
݀ଵ଴଻ሺݐሻ ൌ 1					for		ݐ ൌ 2007q1, q2, q3, q4 																	ൌ 0																					otherwise 
 
  
  Instead of ݕ ൌ logሺݎ݈݁ܽܩܦܲሻ , nominal output denoted by log	ሺ݊ܩܦܲሻ  is taken into 
consideration.  ∆log	ሺ݊ܩܦܲሺݐሻሻ is expressed by the following equation and the log-likelihood 
function of ∆log	ሺ݊ܩܦܲሺݐሻሻ  should be maximized with respect to every parameter containing 
precautionary demand. 
 
∆log	ሺ݊ܩܦܲሺݐሻሻ 
							ൌ ݀଴ ൅ ݀ଵ ∗ ∆log	ሺ݊ܩܦܲሺݐ െ 1ሻሻ 
							൅	݀ଶ ∗ ∆ log൫݉2ሺݐ െ 1ሻ െ ݌ݎ݁ܿ. ݀݁݉ܽ݊݀ሺݐ െ 1ሻ൯ 
							൅	݀ଷ ∗ ∆log	ሺ݉2ሺݐ െ 2ሻ െ ݌ݎ݁ܿ. ݀݁݉ܽ݊݀ሺݐ െ 2ሻሻ ൅ ߝሺݐሻ                                                          (2) 
 
Estimation results of equations (1) and (2) are given in Tables 3 and 4.  
 
                   Table 3  Estimation results in equation(1) 
 Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.  
c1 -77.68188 44.26587 -1.754893 0.0793
c2 0.483055 1.107827 0.436038 0.6628
c3 -23.15774 23.21498 -0.997534 0.1668
 
                    Table 4  Estimation results in equation(2) 
 
  
          Estimation results of trend in equation (1) 
 
 
For space of economy, estimation of trend is given with only coefficients values.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 shows the nominal money stock and the transaction money. The difference between 
the two kinds of money measures the precautionary demand. We find that the difference 
begins to expand rapidly around 1990 when the bubble economy busted and gradually turns 
to shrink around 2001 when the QEMP has been introduced. The actual development of the 
transaction demand and precautionary demand is shown in Figure 4.  
 
The transaction money demand increases in 1980s when Japan’s economy is very sound and 
bullish, and declines in 1990 when the bubble economy busts. On the contrary, the 
precautionary money demand stays at low level in 1980s and gradually increases in 
response to the deteriorating economy. It rapidly increases in the period of financial crisis, 
1998-19998. The deflationary concerns intensified in the private sector. It is the further 
deterioration of financial system and the liquidity constraints of financial institutions that 
sharply increased precautionary demand during this period. 
 
The QEMP contributed to expel the people’s anxiety caused by the financial system 
uncertainty, which destabilize the economy. The Figure 4 clearly shows the increase of 
transaction money demand and decline of the precautionary demand money after the 
introduction of the QEMP in 2001. 
                                                            
8 Hokkaido Takushoku Bank, one of Japan’s city banks (largest twenty banks), and Yamaichi Securities 
Company, one of Japan’s four largest security companies, failed in November 1997. The failure of two big 
financial institutions sent the sign that the government gave up the “too big to fail” policy. People thought no 
financial institutions were immune from failures. Rumors about the other banks’ failure had spread out through 
Japan. The stock prices of many financial institutions sharply declined and “Japan premium” in the international 
money market jumped by around 100 basis points. Japanese banks were obliged to pay the additional basis 
points for raising funds in the oversea financial markets. The premium is calculated as the difference between 
the quoted rates of TIBOR in the Tokyo offshore market and LIBOR in the London offshore market. Bonds 
issued not only by Japanese financial institutions but also by Japanese government were downgraded at the 
investment grade ratings by international credit-rating agencies, such as Moody’s. 
 
 
 
 Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.  
d0 0.001158 0.001485 0.779713 0.4356
d1 -0.095937 0.112673 -0.851458 0.3945
d2 0.293503 0.180195 1.628803 0.1034
d3 0.166242 0.120239 1.382588 0.1668
trend(t)= 
1000*(822.88+29.41*d82(t)-4.89*d83(t)-52.82*d84(t)-130.89*d85(t) 
-168.33*d86(t)-262.48*d87(t)-138.34*d88(t)-28.43*d89(t)-200.30*d90(t) 
-352.35*d91(t)-479.80*d92(t)-222.58*d93(t)-265.89*d94(t)-343.69*d95(t) 
-314.50*d96(t)-204.76*d97(t)-37.08*d98(t)+172.48*d99(t) 
+357.81*d100(t)+707.43*d101(t)+811.72*d102(t)+722.53*d103(t) 
+854.93*d104(t)+808.67*d105(t)+794.73*d106(t)+936.65*d107(t)) 
  
Figure 3 money stock (M2) and transaction money 
 
 
 Figure 4 precautionary money and transaction money 
 
 
Next we estimate the five variables VAR model that consists of CABs, Tankan, transaction 
money, real GDP, and inflation rate (core cpi). We focus on role of Tankan in the 
transmission mechanism of easing monetary policy. 
 
Figure 5 shows the estimated impulse response to a one standard deviation shock to five 
variables. The first column shows that policy shock has a positive impulse on the transaction 
money at the second quarter, though it has a negative effect on the transaction money at the 
first quarter. The first negative shock is triggered by the increase of the precautionary 
money. It also has a positive impact on the real output at third quarter.  The second column 
shows that Tankan immediately affects the transaction money.  Transaction money increases 
as soon as anxiety is dispelled. Tankan also has a positive effect on both output and inflation 
rate. Price response is much delayed than output response. The positive response of inflation 
rate is statistically different from zero at fifth quarter.  
 
The third column shows that transaction money shock has a positive effect on the Tankan. 
Transaction money also has a positive effect on both output and price change. Increase of 
transaction money immediately increases real output, while it has a relayed effect on price 
change. The effect of transaction money on the price is statistically significant at fifth 
quarter. The fourth column indicates that real output has a positive effect on Tankan. 
Output shock has a positive effect on the transaction demand, though its shock on the price 
change is not statistically significant. The last column shows that price change has a 
positive effect on Tankan with five quarters delay. Price change has a positive effect on the 
real output at third quarter.  Real output response is statistically significant at the third 
quarter. The estimation results are summarized as follows. 
 
A quantitative monetary easing has a positive effect on Japan’s prolonged deflation. The 
transmission of the policy effect is through its effect on the transaction money.  In response 
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to an increase of CABs, transaction money increase first. Transaction money contribute to 
the rise of real output and dispel of the anxiety in the future. Increase of transaction money 
also raises price in the five or six quarters. The rise of output and price changes people’s 
mind from negative to the positive. The increase of transaction money indicates that there is 
not a liquidity trap in the period of the QEMP.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5 Impulse Response Functions for 5 variables (∆ሺࢊ࢖࢙࢚ሻ, ࢀࢇ࢔࢑ࢇ࢔, ∆ܔܗ܏ሺ࢚࢘ࢇ࢔࢙.࢓࢕࢔ࢋ࢟ሻ,
∆ሺ࢟ሻ, ࢏࢔ࢌ࢒ࢇ࢚࢏࢕࢔ሻ 
 
4 Concluding remarks 
Many macroeconomist and policy makers have discussed on the effectiveness of non-traditional 
monetary easing which the BOJ adopted at the zero lower bound on interest rate. Some blamed the 
BOJ by arguing the prolonged deflation of Japan’s economy attributed to the Bank of Japan’s past 
monetary policies. The other defend the BOJ’s policy by insisting that expanding unlimitedly the 
assets of the BOJ’s balance sheet without any favourable effect on the economy would risk the 
financial position of the Bank. 
The paper challenged the policy issues by quantifying statistically the effect of the monetary easing, 
during the period of QEMP. We have found monetary easing has a positive effect on the output and 
prices by estimating the simple VAR model composed of three variables; CABs, real GDP, and price 
change. Next we have estimated the transmission mechanism of the effect of monetary easing by 
decomposing money stock into transaction money and precautionary money, using the same VAR 
approach.  Some argued that Japan’s economy already fall into a liquidity trap in which additional 
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monetary easing would lose its effectiveness, because the monetary base and bonds became perfect 
substitutes. They insisted that additional money would be absorbed as a precautionary demand even if 
central bank increased the base money. The money stock would not have any effect on the economy if 
people hold additional money stock by the precautionary motivation.   
We quantified statistically how much money was absorbed into precautionary money by adding the 
expectation variable (Tankan). People tend to increase the precautionary demand if the deflation is 
expected to continue. We found that the precautionary money gradually declines after the QEMP has 
been introduced in 2001. The increased transaction money firmly contributed to the recovery of the 
economy. The new policy seems to mitigate the cash-flow constrain of firms and households. Thus, 
we conclude that the QEMP has the positive effect on the economy by dispelling future deflationary 
concerns. We also confirm the non-existence of a liquidity trap in the QEP period.  
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